# NORTHWEST ARCTIC SUBAREA CONTINGENCY PLAN

# **BACKGROUND SECTION**

PART ONE	SUPPORT INFORMATION	E-1
	A. Subarea Description	E-1
	B. Area of Responsibility	
	C. Regional Multiagency Coordination Committee	E-7
	D. Subarea Committee	E-10
Fig	gures:	
	1 – Northwest Arctic Subarea	E-3
	2 – Northwest Arctic Detailed Subarea map	
	3 – Northwest Arctic Subarea USGS topographic map inde	exE-5
	4 – Northwest Arctic Subarea nautical chart map index	E-6
	5 – Regional MAC Illustration	
	6 – Planning Organization Illustration	E-12
PART TWO	RESPONSE POLICY AND STRATEGIES	E-13
	A. Federal Response Action Priorities/Strategies	E-13
	B. State of Alaska Response Priorities	
PART THREE	AREA SPILL HISTORY	E-16
ABBREVIATIO	NS & ACRONYMS	E-17



# BACKGROUND: PART ONE - SUPPORT INFORMATION

#### A. <u>SUBAREA DESCRIPTION</u>

This Subarea Contingency Plan (SCP) supplements the Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases (the Unified Plan). The SCP in conjunction with the Unified Plan describes the strategy for a coordinated federal, state and local response to a discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil or a release of a hazardous substance from a vessel, offshore facility, or onshore facility operating within the boundaries of the Northwest Arctic Subarea. For its planning process, the federal government has designated the entire state of Alaska as a planning "region" and the western half of the state as a planning "area." The State of Alaska has divided the state into ten planning regions of which one is the "Northwest Arctic Region." As part of the Unified Plan, this SCP addresses this Northwest Arctic Region or, to avoid confusion with federal terms, Subarea.

The SCP shall be used as a framework for response mechanisms and as a pre-incident guide to identify weaknesses and to evaluate shortfalls in the response structure before an incident. The plan also offers parameters for vessel and facility response plans under OPA 90. Any review for consistency between government and industry plans should address the recognition of economically and environmentally sensitive areas and the related protection strategies, as well as a look at the response personnel and equipment (quantity and type) available within the area (including federal, state, and local government and industry) in comparison to probable need during a response.

As defined by Alaska regulations, the Northwest Arctic Region is the area of the State encompassed by the Northwest Arctic Borough and the Bering Straits Regional Corporation, including adjacent shorelines and state waters, and having as its seaward boundary a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. Figures E-1 and E-2 on pages 3 and 4 depicts this area.

Portions of the region are in the arctic, transitional, and continental climatic zones. Permafrost underlies much of the region. The weather in the region is the result of the interaction between global air movements, land topography, and major weather systems that move north-south and east-west across the Bering Sea.

The larger river basins in the region include the Noatak, Kobuk, and Koyuk rivers. Marine waters associated with the region are comprised of the Chukchi and Bering Seas. Sea ice formation in the Chukchi Sea can begin in October and spreads south into the Bering. The ice pack can persist through late June, although the ice begins to melt and break up in April. The entire marine area of the region lies within the continental shelf.

There are a total of 31 towns and villages in the subarea. Deliveries of noncrude oils are made to these locales primarily by barges operating from Dutch Harbor or Cook Inlet. Deliveries are ice dependent, and do not occur as ice forms. Human activities in the Arctic and Subarctic regions revolve around the subsistence, sport, and commercial uses of fish and wildlife. Infrastructure development is minimal by national standards.

The Northwest Arctic Subarea encompasses a vast area that has relatively limited risks in some respects, but elevated risks when considering certain factors. The Northwest Arctic Subarea has a very small population spread over thousands of square miles. The number of facilities storing, handling and transferring refined products is very small. These facilities typically provide fuel for the generation of electricity and for heating


homes. The fuel is also used to power vehicles and vessels, which are relatively few in number as well. Tank barges provide fuel to these facilities no more than twice each year and only during the short open-water season. The shoreline geomorphology of this region does not present a significant hazard to the integrity of a vessel. Most of the shorelines fall into some type of sand/gravel/cobble combination, peat, tidal flats, or vegetated shores.


The operating season is very short in this region because of the late ice breakup and the early freeze-up of the Chukchi and Bering Seas. Vessels have been damaged by ice, an ever present concern. The movement of ice, whether during freeze-up, breakup, or in the dead of winter can produce great stresses on vessels and structures. An improperly engineered structure could sustain damage in this harsh environment. Storm surges could pose a substantial risk to shoreline cleanup operations and personnel. Strong storms and high winds are unusual during the period when vessels are transiting the region.

As with all areas within Alaska, the Northwest Arctic region supports a wide range of wildlife. During the season when the ocean, lakes and rivers are thawed, the inland and shoreline areas become a haven for migratory waterfowl and other birds. Local communities rely on marine mammals as a traditional food source in the coastal communities, and these mammals are present in concentrated areas during certain times of the year. In the northern portion, polar bears roam the ice pack and are susceptible to oiling, as are almost all of the other mammals, birds, and fish in the region. Many residents of the Northwest Arctic Subarea engage in a subsistence lifestyle and rely heavily on the availability of the resources in the area. Any spill of significance could devastate their food harvest and seriously threaten their normal means of existence. Long-term impacts to their food resources could have a disastrous effect on their way of life. The Sensitive Areas Section provides detailed information on the specific resources vulnerable to spills and their locations in the region.

The highest probability of spills of refined products occurs during fuel transfer operations at the remote villages. Historically, the occurrence of spills from facilities during these operations is not significant. Spills of refined product that enter the water will rapidly disperse and evaporate making cleanup difficult. Crude oil will be affected by the same natural degradation factors but to a much lesser degree. Crude oil spills will be persistent and will require aggressive actions and innovative techniques in the harsh Arctic environment.

Spills in the Arctic require careful preplanning to overcome the effects imposed by the environment. Resources at risk during the summer months are much greater in species and number than those in the winter months. Summer daylight increases the available work hours to allow almost continuous operations. The extended daylight does not, however, increase the number of hours a particular individual can safely perform his task. The severe stresses imposed by operating in winter conditions in periods of darkness will seriously reduce individual efficiency over a given period. The severe weather does not always produce a negative effect, but can produce a positive one at times. Ice and snow can act effectively as barriers to impede the spread of oil and can be used successfully to hold and contain oil. Techniques for organizing spill response in arctic environments have been developed, and numerous reference documents detail these procedures.





Northwest Arctic Nautical Chart Map Index — to view the map from the ARRT website, please go to the DNR *Prevention and Emergency Response Subarea Plan Maps* website located at:

<a href="http://www.asgdc.state.ak.us/maps/cplans/subareas.html">http://www.asgdc.state.ak.us/maps/cplans/subareas.html</a>

#### B. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

This Subarea Contingency Plan covers the region outlined above in subpart A. The USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) is the predesignated FOSC for the Coastal Zone which encompasses all navigable waters seaward of the mean high tide line and an area of shoreline 1,000 yards inland of the coastline. The Environmental Protection Agency is the predesignated FOSC for the Inland Zone, which encompasses all lands, rivers, streams, and drainages inland of the 1000-yard wide band that parallels the Alaskan coastline. These zones are clearly defined in the **Unified Plan**. It is possible that incidents may occur in locations that do not fall under federal jurisdiction, and there will be no FOSC in these instances.

The State of Alaska places jurisdiction of spill response for the Northwest Arctic Subarea under the Northern Alaska Response Team (NART) of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. The SOSC for the NART is the predesignated SOSC for the entire Northwest Arctic Subarea.

Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA) exist between the USCG and EPA, the USCG and the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), and EPA and ADEC which further delineate agency and OSC responsibilities. **Annex K of the Unified Plan** includes copies of these MOUs/MOAs.

#### C. REGIONAL MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION COMMITTEE

A regional Multiagency Coordination Committee (RMAC) will normally be activated for significant incidents which involve resources under the jurisdiction of several agencies. Unlike the MAC defined in the ICS of the National Interagency Incident Management System, RMACs for spill response do not play a direct role in setting incident priorities or allocating resources. The RMAC can advise the Unified Command (through the Liaison Officer) and provide comments and recommendations on incident priorities, objectives and action plans.

Figure E-5 provides the general location of the RMAC in relation to the Unified Command organizational structure. Additionally, the suggested/potential membership of the RMAC is provided in Figure E-5. Membership on the RMAC is dependent upon the location of the incident and the interests or jurisdiction of the affected communities, landowners, and special interest groups. Agencies/organizations that are functioning as part of the overall ICS response structure should not provide redundant representation on the RMAC.

During incidents where there is no FOSC, federal agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities for resources at risk could participate as members of the RMAC, thus retaining their input on containment, oversight, and cleanup. However, the preferred approach is to include these agencies as part of the overall ICS structure.

As indicated above, the RMACs are not directly involved in tactical operations, though some of its members may be. The RMACs' role is to convey to the Unified Command information relating to the authority, concerns and expertise of its members. It recommends to the Unified Command overall objectives and priorities and reviews the Incident Action Plans.

RMAC activities will be coordinated by the Liaison Officer. RMAC discussions will be documented and recommendations and dissenting opinions will be communicated to the Unified Command through the Liaison Officer. The RMAC will be chaired initially by the Liaison Officer. After convening, the RMAC will then elect its own chair.

<b>Senior Leaders of Impacted Communities:</b> An alternative to the RMAC for communities affected by a major spill may include the establishment of a group consisting of senior leaders of affected communities. The group should have direct access to the ADEC Commissioner or his/her representative.				
Northwest Arctic SCP: Background, part one	E- 8	June 2001		

#### Figure E-5

# Northwest Arctic Subarea Regional Multi-agency Coordination Committee

UNIFIED COMMAND		
FOSC	COMMAND STAFF	
SOSC	Information Officer	
*LOSC	Safety Officer	REGIONAL MAC
RPOSC	Liaison Officer	
INCIDENT COMMANDER	·	

#### Suggested Membership:

• Representatives or Community Emergency Coordinators from affected communities. These may include:

•	Northwest Arctic Borough	•	Kiana	•	Selawik
•	Ambler	•	Kivalina	•	Shaktoolik
•	Brevig Mission	•	Kobuk	•	Shishmaref
•	Buckland	•	Kotzebue	•	Shungnak
•	Candle	•	Koyuk	•	Solomon
•	Council	•	Mary's Igloo	•	Stebbins
•	Deering	•	Noatak	•	Teller
•	Diomede	•	Nome	•	Unalakleet
•	Elim	•	Noorvik	•	Wales
•	Gambell	•	St. Michael	•	White Mountain
•	Golovin	•	Savoonga		

- Federal/state/local or private landowners and leaseholders (e.g., National Parks Service, Alaska Dept of Natural Resources)
- Native corporations, organizations and communities
- Representatives from federally-recognized tribes
- Special interest groups affected by the incident

#### D. SUBAREA COMMITTEE

The primary role of the Subarea Committee is to act as a preparedness and planning body for the subarea. The pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinators (EPA and the Coast Guard) for the subarea and the pre-designated State On-Scene Coordinator from the Department of Environmental Conservation compose the primary membership of the Subarea Committee. Each member is empowered by their own agency to make decisions on behalf of the agency and to commit the agency to carrying out roles and responsibilities as described in this plan and the Unified Plan.

The predesignated Federal On-Scene Coordinators for the area (EPA & USCG) will serve as chairpersons of the committee. They will select work group members and provide general direction and guidance for the work groups and the Subarea Committee.

The Subarea Committee is encouraged to solicit advice, guidance or expertise from all appropriate sources and establish work groups as necessary to accomplish the preparedness and planning tasks. The FOSC should solicit the advice of the Alaska Regional Response Team to determine appropriate work group representatives from federal, state and local agencies. Work Group participants may include facility owners/operators, shipping company representatives, cleanup contractors, emergency response officials, marine pilot associations, academia, environmental groups, consultants, response organizations and federal, state and local agency representatives.

#### **Subarea Committee Members**

The Northwest Arctic Subarea Committee is comprised of representatives from the following federal, state and local agencies:

U.S. Coast Guard, COTP Western Alaska U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation Local community representatives, as necessary

The Northwest Arctic Subarea Committee also seeks advice and expertise concerning environmental and economic issues from federal, state and local agencies and private industries such as:

U.S. Department of the Interior
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Alaska Department of Natural Resources
Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
Northwest Arctic Borough
Northwest Arctic Borough Local Emergency Planning Committee
Nome Local Emergency Planning Committee
Federally-recognized tribes

#### **Subarea Work Groups**


The Northwest Arctic Subarea Committee has formed the following work groups:

Representatives from the Coast Guard, ADEC and the EPA co-chair the <u>Operations Work Group</u>. This work group is responsible for scenario development and the refinement/expansion of the Emergency Notification Lists and the Response Checklists located in the Response Section of this plan.

A representative from the U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance chairs the <u>Sensitive Areas Work Group</u>. This group coordinates the preparation of the necessary information for each separate subarea and ensures that the information is submitted in a common format. Participation by local community staff is vital to acquire local input and validate existing information. The Northwest Arctic subarea-specific sensitive areas information has been prepared and incorporated into the Sensitive Areas Section of this plan.

The <u>Logistics Work Group</u> is co-chaired by representatives from the US Coast Guard, EPA, and ADEC. This work group is responsible for preparing the Resources Section of this plan.

# Figure E-6: PLANNING ORGANIZATION NORTHWEST ARCTIC SUBAREA CONTINGENCY PLAN



# BACKGROUND: PART TWO - RESPONSE POLICY AND STRATEGIES

The strategy for responding to a specific spill or hazmat incident depends upon numerous factors. The strategy can change as the situation changes. As a general rule, the strategies listed below should be used as a guide in developing an effective response. Consider all factors that may affect the particular situation and revise/modify/expand these priorities as the situation dictates. The strategies are further delineated in the procedures contained in the Response Section. Additional information can be found in the **Unified Plan**.

#### A. FEDERAL RESPONSE ACTION PRIORITIES/STRATEGIES

The following priorities are general guidelines for response to a pollution incident within the COTP Western Alaska zone. They are based on the premise that the safety of life is of paramount importance in any pollution incident, with the protection of property and the environment, although important, being secondary. Nothing in this part is meant to indicate that higher priority items must be completed before performing a lower priority task. They may be carried out simultaneously or in the most logical sequence for each individual incident.

<u>Priority One</u> - Safety of Life - for all incidents which may occur, the safety of personnel, including response personnel, must be given absolute priority. No personnel are to be sent into an affected area without first determining the hazards involved and that adequate precautions have been taken to protect personnel.

 $\underline{Priority\ Two}$  - Safety of Vessel/Facility and Cargo - the facility and/or vessel and its cargo shall become the second priority.

<u>Priority Three</u> - Protection of the Environment by elimination of the pollution source - containment and recovery of oil in the open water must be effected expeditiously to preclude involvement of the beaches and shorelines. Due to remote locations and restricted accessibility, it is extremely difficult to protect the majority of the coastline by diversion or exclusion methods. Therefore, securing the source and open water containment and recovery is especially critical and should normally be the first line of defense to protect the environment. Likewise, spills which occur on land or in upland water courses will be dammed, boomed, diked, etc., as feasible to prevent the spread of the pollutant downstream. NOTE: *In situ* burning (Unified Plan, Annex F for checklist) of a vessel and its pollutant may be an alternative considered by the OSCs; this strategy places environmental protection priorities above saving the vessel and its cargo.

<u>Priority Four</u> - Protection of the Environment by diversion/exclusion, dispersion, or in-situ burning. In the event that the location of a spill or the weather conditions do not permit open water recovery, protection of the shoreline becomes paramount, especially areas of greatest sensitivity. It is not possible to protect some areas entirely or even in part. It may be necessary to sacrifice some areas in order to achieve the best overall protection of the environment. The OSC may consider *in situ* burning as a response option. Refer to the **Unified Plan** for an *in situ* burning checklist. The use of dispersants must be considered early in the response phase while the oil is in the open water. Subpart J of the NCP and the **Unified Plan (Annex F)** address in detail the responsibilities of the OSC in the use of chemicals.

<u>Priority Five</u> - Protection of the Environment by beach cleanup and the use of Sacrificial Areas. It may not be possible to protect the entire shoreline from oil. In fact, it may be allowed purposely to come ashore in some areas as an alternative to damaging others. Selection of the proper shoreline cleanup technique depends on many different factors including the following:

- Type of substrate
- Amount of oil on the shoreline
- Depth of oil in the sediment
- Type of oil (tar balls, pooled oil, viscous coating, etc.)
- Trafficability of equipment on the shoreline
- Environmental or cultural sensitivity of the oil shoreline
- Prevailing oceanographic and meteorological conditions

The best way to minimize debate over the most appropriate response is to involve all interested government and private agencies. The shoreline assessment groups shall attempt to agree on the amount and character of the oil that is on the shorelines, anticipate interactions between the stranded oil and the environment, and the geological and ecological environment of the involved shorelines. Once a consensus is met, a process is necessary to determine the proper treatment required.

Shoreline cleanup options may include the use of physical and/or chemical processes. Chemical shoreline cleanup products may increase the efficiency of water-washing during the cleanup of contaminated shorelines. However, the product must be listed on the EPA National Contingency Plan Product Schedule and authorization must be obtained from the ARRT and the government on-scene coordinator at the spill. Physical shoreline cleaning methods include techniques such as: natural recovery, manual sorbent application, manual removal of oiled materials, low pressure flushing (ambient temperature), vacuum trucks, warm water washing, high pressure flushing, manual scraping, mechanical removal using heavy equipment. Bioremediation is also considered as a shoreline cleaning method. Bioremediation is the application of nutrients to the shoreline to accelerate the natural biodegradation of oil. The OSC shall request the RRT to provide site-specific guidelines for source protection measures required during shoreline cleanup operations.

#### B. STATE OF ALASKA RESPONSE PRIORITIES

- 1. **Safety:** Ensure the safety of persons involved, responding, or exposed to the immediate effects of the incident.
- 2. **Public Health:** Ensure protection of public health and welfare from the direct or indirect effects of contamination of drinking water, air, and food.
- 3. **Environment:** Ensure protection of the environment, natural and cultural resources, and biota from the direct or indirect effects of contamination.
- 4. **Cleanup:** Ensure adequate containment, control, cleanup and disposal by the responsible party or supplement or take over when cleanup is inadequate.
- 5. **Restoration:** Ensure assessment of contamination and damage and restoration of property, natural resources and the environment.
- 6. **Cost Recovery:** Ensure recovery of costs and penalties to the Response Fund for response, containment, removal, remedial actions, or damage.

# **BACKGROUND: PART THREE - SUBAREA SPILL HISTORY**

The Northwest Arctic Subarea experiences a limited amount of vessel traffic, primarily resupply barges and fuel barges. A fair number of releases occur in this region due to industry and fuel resupply challenges in remote villages. With limited access by air and water, and virtually no roads, a major spill in the region would present sever logistical problems for spill responders. Response to major spills in this subarea is further compounded by the relatively short ice-free periods on the open ocean.

The information below, collected from the ADEC spills database, notes some of the more significant or indicative spills and releases. A complete list is available through ADEC.

#### NAVIGABLE WATERS SPILL HISTORY

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location - Incident</u>	<b>Substance</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
8/10/94	Cape Nome - grounding	Diesel	20,000 gal.
9/13/95	Elim – line ruptured	Gasoline	7000 gal.

#### **INLAND SPILL HISTORY**

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location - Incident</u>	<b>Substance</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
7/29/93	Cominco Red Dog mine port site, pit #2	Diesel	36,000 gal.
7/16/96	Kiana – valve left open	Diesel	950 gal.
1/23/97	Savoonga tank farm – nozzle failure	Diesel	5000 gal.
4/27/97	Diomede Joint Utilities Co. – corrosion	Diesel	516 gal.
6/26/97	Gambell tank farm – leak	Diesel	8000 gal.
5/3/98	Shungnak tank farm – line ruptured	Diesel	3000 gal.
11/2/98	Nome, downtown – faulty valve	Diesel	1000 gal.

#### **HAZMAT RELEASE HISTORY**

<u>Date</u>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Substance</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
7/27/98	Kotzebue – cause unknown	unidentified hazardous substance	1000 gal.
5/27/99	Little Diomede – puncture	unidentified hazardous substance	2000 gal.

1996-2001 Cominco Red Dog mine – over 30 separate incidents resulting in the release of several hundred thousand gallons of hazardous substances, including 200,000 gallons of magnesium oxide slurry (5/31/98), 30 tons of lead concentrate (10/10/00), 40 tons of zinc concentrate (12/28/00), and sulfuric acid.

June 2001

# **BACKGROUND: PART FOUR - ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS**

AAC Alaska Administrative Code

ACFT Aircraft

ACP Area Contingency Plan

ACS Alaska Clean Seas (North Slope industry cooperative)

ADCED Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development

ADEC Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
ADF&G Alaska Department of Fish and Game, also as ADFG
ADMVA Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs

ADNR Alaska Department of Natural Resources

ADOT&PF Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, also as ADOTPF

AFB Air Force Base AIR Air Operations

AK ANG Alaska Army National Guard

ALCOM Alaska Command

ANSC Alaska North Slope Crude oil
ANWR Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
ARRT Alaska Regional Response Team
AS Alaska Statute, also Air Station (USAF)

ASAP As soon as possible

BBLS Barrels

BLM Bureau of Land Management BOA Basic Ordering Agreement

CAMEO Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations

CCGD 17 Commander, Coast Guard District 17

CEMP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COM Communications equipment/capabilities
COMDTINST Commandant Instruction (USCG)
COTP Captain of the Port (USCG)

CP Command Post C-Plan Contingency Plan

CTAG Cultural Technical Advisory Group
DAA Documentation/Administrative Assistance

DES Division of Emergency Services (a division under ADMVA)

DOD Department of Defense DOI Department of the Interior

DOI-FWS Department of the Interior – Fish and Wildlife Service

DRAT District Response Advisory Team

DRG District Response Group
EMS Emergency Medical Services
ENV Environmental Unit Support
EOC Emergency Operations Center

EPA Environmental Protection Agency, also as USEPA

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986

E-17

ESI (Alaskan) Environmental Sensitivity Index

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FIN Finance

FIR Fire Protection/fire fighting

F/V Fishing Vessel

FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FLIP Flight Information Publication
FOG Field Operations Guide
FPN Federal Pollution Number

FOSC Federal On-Scene Coordinator
FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act
GIS Geographic Information System
GRS Geographic Response Strategies
GSA General Services Administration
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials, also as hazmat

HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (a training program)

HQ Headquarters

IC Incident Commander
ICS Incident Command System

IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization

JPO Joint Pipeline Office (gov't agencies involved with managing/regulating TAPS)

LAT Latitude LEG Legal

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee
LEPD Local Emergency Planning District
LERP Local Emergency Response Plan

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

LO Liaison Officer LONG Longitude

LOSC Local On-Scene Coordinator
LRRS Long Range Radar Station
MAC MultiAgency Committee

MAP Mapping

MAR CH Marine Channel

MED Medical Support/Health Care

MESA Most Environmentally Sensitive Area

M/V Motor Vessel

MLC Maintenance and Logistics Command (USCG Pacific Area)

MLT Municipal Lands Trustee Program

MOA Memoranda of Agreement, also Municipality of Anchorage

MOU Memoranda of Understanding
MSD Marine Safety Detachment (USCG)
MSO Marine Safety Office (USCG)

MSRC Marine Spill Response Corp. (national industry cooperative)

NART Northern Alaska Response Team

NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan

E-18

NIIMS National Interagency Incident Management System
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOTAMS Notice to All Mariners; also, Notice to Airmen NPDES National Pollution Discharge Elimination System

NPFC National Pollution Fund Center NRC National Response Center NRT National Response Team

NRDA Natural Resource Damage Assessment (Federal/State)

NSF National Strike Force

NSFCC National Strike Force Coordinating Center

NWA Northwest Arctic
NWR NOAA Weather Radio

OHMSETT Oil and Hazardous Material Simulated Environment Test Tank

OOD Duty Officer or Officer On Duty OPA 90 Oil Pollution Act of 1990

OPCEN Operations Center

OPS General Response Operations, also Office of Pipeline Safety (U.S. DOT)

OSC On-Scene Coordinator

OSHA Occupational Health and Safety Administration

OSLTF Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund OSRO Oil Spill Response Organization

O/S On-Scene

PIAT Public Information Assist Team
PIO Public Information Officer

PL Private Line

PLN General Planning Operations
POLREP Pollution Report (USCG)
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
RAC Response Action Contractor
RCC Rescue Coordination Center

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1978 RMAC Regional Multi-Agency Coordination Committee

RP Responsible Party

RPOSC Responsible Party On-Scene Coordinator RPD Recovery, Protection and Decontamination

RQ Reportable Quantity
RRT Regional Response Team
RV Recreational Vehicle
SAR Search and Rescue

SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SCP Subarea Contingency Plan

SEC Security

SHPO State Historic Preservation Officer (ADNR)

SITREP Situation Report (ADEC)
SONS Spill of National Significance
SOSC State On-Scene Coordinator

SS Technical Expertise/Scientific Support SSC Scientific Support Coordinator (NOAA)

STORMS Standard Oil Spill Response Management System

SUPSALV U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage, also as NAVSUPSALV

TA Trajectory Analysis

TAPS Trans Alaska Pipeline System

TPO Tribal Police Officer

T/V Tank Vessel

USAF United States Air Force USCG United States Coast Guard

VOSS Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System

VPO Village Police Officer

VPSO Village Public Safety Officer

VTS Vessel Traffic System

WRR Wildlife Protection/Care/Rehabilitation/Recovery

WX Weather